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THE "CHARITIES" PROVISIONS OF THE ITERNAL REVENUE
CODE
JOSEPH B. LYNCHt
By the "charities" provisions of the Internal Revenue Code are meant those
sections or subdivisions of the Code which relate to a corporation, trust, or
community chest, fund, or foundation organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes, or for the pre-
vention of cruelty to children or animals, or which relate to gifts or bequests for
the above described purposes. These provisions represent a development in
Federal tax laws extending over many years. Thus, while the Revenue Act
of 1913 exempted religious, charitable, scientific and educational corporations
from income taxes, contributions to such organizations were first allowed as
income tax deductions to individuals in the Revenue Act of 1917, to estates and
trusts in the Revenue Act of 1918, and to corporations in the Revenue Act of
1935. In the Revenue Act of 1917, income tax deductions were permitted to
individuals for contributions to corporations or associations organized for the
purposes therein described. The provision was expanded in the Revenue Act
of 1921 to include a community chest, fund or foundation, and in the Revenue
Act of 1924 to include a trust. In the Revenue Act of 1938 it was restricted
to such organizations only if "domestic", and in the Revenue Act of 1939 it
was somewhat broadened to include such organizations, if "created or organ-
ized in the United States or in any possession thereof or under the law of the
United States or of any State or Territory or of any possession of the United
States". Meanwhile, the provision with respect to income tax deductions to
individuals was altered from time to time in other respects. New charities
provisions were added, and these in turn were amended in the successive revenue
acts, now by way of enlargement, now by way of limitation. Today, the pro-
visions are fairly numerous,1 but instead of the finely coordinated series of sec-
tions which one might expect as a result of gradual evolution over so long a
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. Income tax deductions: Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 23(o), 120 (citizens
and residents) ; §§ 23(q), 102(d)(1)(B) (corporations); § 162(a) (estates and trusts);
§ 183(c) (partnerships); § 213(c) (nonresident alien individuals); § 232(b) (foreign
corporations); § 336(a) (2) (foreign personal holding companies); 505(a) (2) (personal
holding companies).
Income tax exemption: Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. A. § 101(6). Also exemption
from other taxes, e.g., capital stock taxes [§ 1201 (a) (1)] by reference to § 101.
Estate tax deductions: Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. A. § 812(d) (estates of citi-
zens and residents) ; § 861(a) (3) (non-resident aliens).
Gift tax deductions: Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. A. § 1004(a) (2) (citizens and
residents) ; § 1004(b) (non-resident aliens).
Employment tax exclusions: Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 1426(b) (8),
1607(c) (8).
Admissions tax exemption: Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. A. § 1701(a).
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period, an examination of the charities sections of the Code discloses a con-
glomeration of inconsistencies, inaccuracies and omissions.
The public policy underlying the charities provisions is indicated in the Ways
and Means Committee Report on the Revenue Bill of 1938, C. B. 1939-1, 742,
as follows:
"The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and
other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for
the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have
to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from
the promotion of the general welfare. The United States derives no such benefit
from gifts to foreign institutions, and the proposed limitation is consistent with
the above theory. If the recipient, however, is a domestic organization the fact that
some portion of its funds is used in other countries for charitable and other purposes
(such as missionary and educational purposes) will not affect the deductibility of
the gift."
The Congressional theory, whether one accepts it as sound or rejects it as too
narrow, especially in these times, is that gifts to foreign institutions confer no
benefit upon the United States. Except as circumscribed by this theory, the
Congressional policy is to encourage gifts to charity, which promote the general
welfare or relieve the Government of financial burdens. The present Code
provisions, however, do not appear fully to reflect the above stated theory, nor
do judicial interpretations of the charities provisions always harmonize with
the underlying Congressional policy.
In the interpretation of the charities sections of the Code, the ordinary
rules of judicial construction are usually thrust aside. There are probably
no rules more familiar to the tax practitioner than that a tax deduction, being
a matter of legislative grace, must, to be sustained, be brought squarely within
the statutory language, and that exemption provisions are strictly construed.
The most recent statement of the general rule by the Supreme Court was made
in Deputy v. DuPont, in which Mr. Justice Douglas, delivering the opinion of
the Court, said:
"But allowance of deductions from gross income does not turn on general equitable
considerations. It 'depends upon legislative grace; and only as there is clear pro-
vision therefor can any particular deduction be allowed'. New Colonial Ice Co. v.
Helvering, 292 U. S. 435, 440."2
This was an income tax case involving the deduction of a business expense.
The same rule has since been reechoed by Judge Bratton in his dissenting
opinion in Commissioner v. Bonfils Trust, as follows:
"Deductions from gross income depend upon legislative grace. They do not rest
upon equitable considerations. A taxpayer seeking a deduction must found his claim
upon a statute and bring himself within its terms."3
2. 308 U. S. 488, 493 (1940).
3. 115 F. (2d) 788, 793 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940).
19411
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
This, also, was an income tax case involving, however, a deduction for a char-
itable contribution. The Court declined to be bound by the rule, but followed
the theory that since it was the purpose of Congress to encourage charitable
gifts, the provisions of the statute should be construed so as to further and
not to hinder their beneficent purpose. Although the dissenting Judge pointed
out that it could not "be foretold with absolute certainty" that the funds in
question were "permanently set aside" for charitable purposes, the Court took
a practical view and held that the statute did not require absolute certainty.
But even starting with the premise that the legislative policy is to encourage
transfers to charitable institutions, and that the judicial inclination is to
effectuate that policy, there are certain definite limitations beyond which even
the most liberal-minded court will not pass.
Developing the foregoing considerations, the scope of this paper is to note
the inconsistencies, inaccuracies and lack of uniformity in the charities pro-
visions, to demonstrate the lengths to which the courts have gone to favor the
charities, and to mark the outside boundaries.
I. Inconsistencies in the Present Provisions
Two of the limitations which the Code provides upon tax deductions for
gifts and bequests to charities are the limitations with respect to (1) the place
of creation or organization of the charity, and (2) the place where the gift is to
be used. The following table indicates such limitations:
Tax Deduction Donee
Limitations as to
Place of Organiza- Place Where Gift
tion of Charity to be Used
23(o) Income tax
(Citizen or Res.)
23(q) Income tax
(Corporation)
162(a) Income tax
(Estate or
Trust)
213(c) Income tax
(Nonres. Alien)
812(d) Estate tax
(Citizen or Res.)
861(a) (3) Estate tax
(Nonres. Alien)
1004(a)(2) Gift tax
(Citizen or Res.)
1004(b) Gift tax
(Nonres. Alien)
Corporation
Trust, &c.
Corporation
Trust, &c.
Corporation
Trust, &c.
Corporation
Com. Chest &c.
Corporation
Trustee
Corporation
Trustee
Corporation
Trust, &c.
Corporation
Trust, &c.
U. S. or Possessions
11
U. S.
C'
None
U.S.
None
cc
U.S.
None
None
9C
cc
U. S. or Possessions
None
cc
U. S.
None
cc
U. S.
Sections of
I. R. C.
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It will be noted that there is little uniformity in these limitations. For some
of the differences there is a sound foundation; for others, no reasonable explana-
tion is apparent. In the case of a citizen or resident claiming an income tax
deduction for a charitable contribution, the limitation with respect to the place
of organization of the charity is the United *States or its possessions, while in
the case of a nonresident alien claiming a similar deduction, the limitation with
respect to the place of organization of the charity is the United States, which
excludes its possessions. This discrepancy is not illogical. Since the nonresident
alien is taxed only on income from sources within the United States, excluding
its possessions, it is quite consistent that his deduction for charitable contribu-
tions should be limited to organizations created in the United States. But not
all of the differences are so logical.
(1) If a citizen or resident is allowed an income tax deduction for gifts
to a corporation only if the corporation is organized in the United States or its
possessions,4 why should he be allowed a gift tax deduction for gifts to a
corporation, irrespective of the place of organization of the corporation? 5
Accepting the announced Congressional theory that the "United States derives
no .. .benefit from gifts to foreign institutions", is it not inconsistent to dis-
allow as an income tax deduction a gift to a foreign corporation, but to allow
as a gift tax deduction a gift to the same corporation?
(2) If a citizen or resident is allowed an income tax deduction for gifts to
a trust, community chest, fund or foundation only if the donee is created in
the United States or its possessions,6 why should a corporation be allowed an
income tax deduction for gifts to a trust, community chest, fund or foundation
only if both (a) the donee is created in the United States or its possessions, and
(b) the gifts are to be used in the United States or its possessions?7 What
public policy dictates that only one limitation should be imposed in the case of
an individual taxpayer, and two limitations in the case of a corporate taxpayer?
(3) If a nonresident alien is allowed an income tax deduction for gifts to
a community chest, fund or foundation, if the donee is created in the United
States, whether or not the gifts are to be used in the United States,8 why is a
nonresident alien allowed a gift tax deduction for gifts to a community chest,
fund or foundation, if the gifts are to be used in the United States, whether
or not the donee is created in the United States?9 Why, for the purpose of one
tax, should the limitation be with respect to the place of organization of the
donee, and, for the purpose of the other, the place where the gift is to be used?
Among the discrepancies of lesser importance may be noted the following:
(a) In the sections of the Code allowing to citizens or residents and to cor-
4. 26 U. S. C. A. § 23(0).
5. 26 U. S. C. A. § 1004(a) (2).
6. 26 U. S. C. A. § 23(o).
7. 26 U. S. C. A. § 23(q).
8. 26 U. S. C. A. § 213(c).
9. 26 U. S. C. A. § 1004(b).
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porations income tax deductions for charitable contributions, the deductions
are allowable if the contributions are "to or for the use of" the specified char-
ities, but in the section relating to nonresident aliens,10 the deduction is allow-
able only if the contribution is "to" the specified charities.
(b) Similarly, in such sections, the specified charities include a "trust, or
community chest, fund, or foundation", while Section 213 (c) specifies "com-
munity chests, funds, or foundations" but not trusts.
(c) The phrase "under the law of the United States or of any State or
Territory", appearing in Section 23 (o) and elsewhere in the Code, in relation
to the place of organization of the charity, is amplified in Section 23 (q) to
"under the law of the United States, or of any State or Territory, or of the
District of Columbia".
(d) Organizations created "for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals", specified in Section 23 (o) and elsewhere in the Code as qualified
charities, are, in Section 23 (q), limited to organizations created "for the pre-
vention of cruelty to children".
(e) The phrase, "encouragement of art", is included as an educational
purpose under the gift tax provisions" in relation to a gift to a corporation or
foundation organized for educational purposes, and in relation to a gift to a
fraternal society to be used for educational purposes, and is included as an
educational purpose under the estate tax provisions' 2 in relation to a bequest
to a corporation organized for educational purposes, but is not included therein
in relation to a bequest to a fraternal society to be used for educational pur-
poses; nor is the phrase included as an educational purpose in any of the
income tax provisions of the Code.
(f) Throughout the Code, a charity, wherever described, is uniformly re-
stricted by the clause:
"no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
(in some sections 'stockholder') or individual",
except in Section 1004 (b) (3), providing for certain gift tax deductions in
the case of nonresident aliens, wherein the restrictive clause is omitted.
From the foregoing it is apparent that the charities provisions of the Code
are scarcely models of coordination or draftsmanship. Revisions based upon
the following considerations should, it is thought, result in an improvement:
If Congress wishes to impose a limitation on deductions for gifts to in-
corporated charities by reference to the place of organization of the charity
(U. S. or possessions), the limitation should be made uniformly to apply to
gifts by citizens or residents, by corporations and by estates and trusts, under
the income tax provisions, and by citizens or residents, under the estate and
gift tax provisions, of the Code.
10. 26 U. S. C. A. § 213(c).
11. 26 U. S. C. A. § 1004.
12. 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 812, 861.
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If Congress wishes to impose a limitation on deductions for gifts to un-
incorporated charities by reference either to the place of organization of the
charity (U. S. or possessions), or to the place where the gift is to be used
(U. S. or possessions), the limitation should be made uniformly to apply to
gifts by citizens or residents, by corporations and by estates and trusts, under
the income tax provisions, and by citizens or residents, under the estate and
gift tax provisions of the Code.
If Congress wishes to impose .a limitation on deductions for gifts to un-
incorporated charities by reference either to the place of organization of the
charity (U. S.), or to the place where the gift is to be used (U. S.), the limita-
tion should be made uniformly to apply to gifts by nonresident aliens under
the income tax, estate tax and gift tax provisions of the Code.
In the interest of simplicity and accuracy, it appears that the Code should
supply a definition of the term "charity", the defined term to be substituted for
the lengthy and varying descriptions of charities now appearing in the several
charities provisions. Thus, Section 3797, which defines various terms, might
be amended by adding a further subdivision to read:
"The term 'charity' means 'any corporation, trust or community chest, fund or
foundation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary or educational purposes, including the encouragement of art and the preven-
tion of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation'."
I. The Extent of Judicial Liberalization
(a) Charitable and Educational Organizations
The courts have defined "charitable" in many tax cases, relying on sources
that hark back to the days of Chancellor Kent, and even to biblical quota-
tions.'3 The application of the definitions to cases arising under the revenue
laws has, however, produced some extraordinary results.
Thus, in Gimbel v. Comnissioner,14 deductions were allowed for contribu-
tions to Gimbel Brothers Foundation whose "main or dominant purpose" was
the grant of pensions to employees of Gimbel Brothers, Inc. The Board of
Tax Appeals' 5 found no evidence that the financial condition of the recipients
was one of the reasons which entitled such persons to pensions. Another pur-
pose of the Foundation was "carrying life insurance of employees". This,
too, was "regardless of their financial need". To label an organization "char-
itable" whose principal object is to grant pensions without reference to the
financial needs of the pensioners, was too liberal a construction for the Board
13. Bok v. McCaughn, 42 F. (2d) 616 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930).
14. 54 F. (2d) 780 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931).
15. Gimbel v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A. 213 (1930).
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to allow, but the Court held the donations to be deductible as contributions to
charity.
Similarly, in Havemeyer v. Commissioner,16 an organization was formed and
operated by members of a family and a close business associate. It was cus-
tomary for each contributor to suggest the person to be aided, and the funds
were mainly given to old family retainers. The Board of Tax Appeals,17 thought
'that the purpose of the organization was "to confer a private benefit" on those
in whose welfare the petitioner and his family were interested, and that neither
the public nor the community in general was concerned in any way. Although
the policy underlying the statute does not seem to have envisaged such a family
association dispensing private gifts as a charitable organization, the Court held
it to be such, reversing the Board.
The term "educational", like the term "charitable", is also given the broadest
application. As construed by the courts, the term relates rather to the "im-
parting of knowledge" than to "the training of the mental and moral powers".
Obviously, this opens a wide field. Thus, in Weyl v. Commissioner,'8 the Board
held that the League for Industrial Democracy, whose object was "education
for a new social order based on production for use and not for profit", was
not an educational corporation, since its printed literature, "far from being
devoted to 'educating' in the sense of presenting both sides of the matter in
which it was interested, advocated its side". Member Sternhagen dissented,
agreeing, however, that "as used in the statute the word educational does not
carry the broadest signification to be found in the dictionary"; but the Circuit
Court,19 after quoting with approval the most comprehensive dictionary defini-
tion, reversed the Board.
The latest published court decision relating to an educational corporation
under the Code, 20 deals with the question whether an organization, one of whose
main objectives was "to warn the unsuspecting purchaser . . . against the
fascinating and intriguing neighborhood canvasser and impostor", and to stress
"integrity in advertising and in business transactions", was a corporation
organized exclusively for educational purposes, and, as such, exempt from
employment taxes. For income tax purposes, the Internal Revenue Bureau
had classified the organization as a civic league. As such, it would not be
exempt from Social Security taxes. The Court, although admitting that the
question was novel, and one on which the appellate courts had not passed,
held the organization to be exclusively educational.
In U. S. v. Proprietors of Social Law Library, ' the Court had under con-
16. 98 F. (2d) 706 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
17. Havemeyer v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A. 859 (1937).
18. 18 B. T. A. 1092 (1930).
19. Weyl v. Commissioner, 48 F. (2d) 811 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
20. Better Business Bureau v. Jones, 34 F. Supp. 537 (W. D. Okla. 1940).
21. 102 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939).
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sideration the question whether a private law library was exempt from Federal
capital stock taxes. The Library was financed by and open mainly to subscribers
within the legal profession. The Court, observing that it was "of inestimable
benefit to the public" that all cases arising in the practice of law be subjected
to the widest possible examination and study, and that the knowledge acquired
by lawyers through the facilities of the Library resulted in "thd better admin-
istration of the law", affirmed the District Court which had allowed the exemp-
tion. The fact that lawyers, individually, received "direct benefits in their
business from the acquisition of knowledge contained in the books of the
Library" was disregarded as incidental and immaterial. In view of the fore-
going, it would seem that the finding in Cook v. Commissioner,2 that the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York was not an educational cor-
poration, might be otherwise, if the question arose again. Article II of the Bar
Association's Constitution provides:
"The Association is established for the purposes of cultivating the science of juris-
prudence, promoting reforms in the law, facilitating the administration of justice,
elevating the standard of integrity, honor and courtesy in the legal profession, and
cherishing the spirit of brotherhood among the members thereof."
If, in the cited cases, the Bettef Business Bureau, stressing integrity in ad-
vertising and business, ana the Library, promoting "the better administration
of the law", are corporations organized and operated exclusively for educational
purposes, the Bar Association might well be given a similar classification under
the Code. This is especially likely since the Board in the Caok case2 com-
plained that the evidence did not show to what extent the Bar Association in
its actual activities was "educational" as distinguished from "social".2
The requirement of the Code that organizations, to come within the scope
of the charities provisions, must be organized and operated exclusively for the
purposes enumerated, has been somewhat emasculated by court decisions. An
organization wherein social features predominate can scarcely be classified as
an exclusively charitable or educational organization. College fraternities, for
example, despite their close connection with institutions of learning, are pre-
dominantly social organizations, yet in Smith v. Commissionier gifts to the
22. 30 B. T. A. 292 (1934).
23. Cook v. Commissioner, 30 B. T. A. 292 (1934).
24. However, a bequest to the Waterbury Medical Association was held not to
be deductible in Colonial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 19 B. T. A. 174 (1930). The Asso-
ciation's purposes were threefold: "(1) To establish the practice of medicine and surgery
in the city of Waterbury upon a respectable footing; (2) to, devise and carry into effect
measures for the mutual improvement of the members, and (3) to promote a good under-
standing and harmonious intercourse with each other." The Board decided that these
were not purposes envisaged by the statute. The Board also denied a deduction for a gift
to the American Institute of Accountants whose object was to "unite the accountancy
profession ... ; to safeguard the interests of public accountants ... ; to encourage cordial
intercourse among accountants." May v. Commissioner, 1 B. T. A. 1220 (1925).
25. 28 B. T. A. 422 (1933).
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national organization and certain local chapters of Chi Psi Fraternity were
held deductible, presumably (since there was no evidence of the use to which
the gifts in question were to be put), on the ground that the fraternity was an
educational organization. The Board relied chiefly on evidence that the
charter and by-laws of the local chapters contained scholastic standards for
admission to the fraternity, and also a system of tutoring by upper classmen
in the various chapters.
Although even before the amendment to the revenue laws restricting organ-
izations within the charities provisions to those "no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation", it was recognized that an organization formed to dissem-
inate such propaganda was not educational, organizations apparently vulner-
able on that score have been given an exempt status. Thus, in Leubuscker v.
Commissioner,26 it was held that one of the Manhattan Single Tax Club's pur-
poses was to advocate the Henry George doctrine, that to advocate meant
"to plead in favor of", and that this did not express an educational purpose,
but rather a purpose to disseminate controversial propaganda. In the same
case, however, the court reversed the Board2 7 which had disallowed an estate
tax deduction for a bequest to a corporation the purposes of which were, not
only to disseminate the Henry George theories, but also "to assist in all proper
ways to establish the same in practical operation of law". The decedent's will
contained the recital:
"Being firmly convinced that the principles expounded by Henry George in his
immortal book entitled 'Progress and Poverty' will, if enacted into law, give equal
opportunity to all and tend to the betterment of the individual and of society",
and provided a bequest to a corporation directed to be formed "for teaching,
expounding and propagating the ideas of Henry George". The Board, correctly,
it seems, held that the bequest was not deductible, saying that despite the fact
that the corporation's activities had been confined to libraries and colleges, "the
power to engage in legislative and other noneducational operations deprives
the corporation of the exclusively educational or charitable character required
by the statute". Here was an organization devoted to propagating ideas its
founder wished to see "enacted into law", an organization formed to establish
such ideas "in practical operation of law". Was it not an over-liberalization of
the statute to hold that such an organization did not have for one of its main
purposes the advocacy of the Henry George principles? Was not the organiza-
tion quite as vulnerable, from the standpoint of the charities provisions, as the
Manhattan Single Tax Club?
28
26. 54 F. (2d) 998 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
27. Leubusher v. Commissioner, 21 B. T. A. 1022 (1930).
28. Contributions have been held not deductible because the organization was engaged
in legislative activities. Fales v. Commissioner, 9 B. T. A. 828 (1927) (International Reform
Bureau, Massachusetts Anti-Saloon League, and Massachusetts Anti-Cigarette League);
[Vol. 10
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In Faulkner v. Commissioner20 the Board had disallowed an income tax de-
duction for a gift made in 1935 to the Birth Control League of Massachusetts.
The first object of the League was to collect and correlate information regarding
birth control and educate the public on the subject. Its principal activities
consisted of operating Mothers' Health Offices at which contraceptive advice
was given. One of the Health Offices in Massachusetts had been dosed by the
police in 1937. In 1938, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found that at
that office the Massachusetts Penal Statutes had been violated. The Board
held that it
"would be contrary to public policy, if not directly contrary to the intention of Con-
gress, to construe the Federal taxing statute as granting privileges to taxpayers which
would lend encouragement to the support of activities inimical to the laws of the
several states",
but the Circuit Court, reversed, holding that the illegal acts had occurred after
the gift, and that even if the activities were illegal,
"it would not necessarily follow that the deduction should be disallowed. Interpreta-
tion of the word 'charitable' in a federal revenue act is a matter of federal, not
local, law." 30
This would seem to open up interesting possibilities. Would it not be an
anomalous situation that an organization illegally operated under a State law,
could be favored by tax exemption under a Federal law?
The difficulty, of course, with over-liberalization of the charities provisions
is that it may in time produce a public reaction in which organizations clearly
entitled to the benefits of the Code provisions and those whose right thereto
is not so clear will suffer alike. The statement of Acting Director' C. B. Pond
of the New York State Research and Statistical Bureau, appearing in the
July, 1940 issue of The Tax Magazine that the "majority of citizens regard
tax exemptions as a parasitic growth upon taxable values, one which in time
may destroy its host", is surely an exaggeration, but there is a considerable
body of public opinion opposed to further extension of exemption in matters of
local taxes. May not ultra-liberalization of the Code provisions by judicial de-
cisions cause the pendulum to swing in the opposite direction in matters of Fed-
eral taxes?
(b) Limitations Based on Net Income
The statutory limitation upon deductions for charitable contributions relates
Forstall v. Commissioner, 29 B. T. A. 428 (1933) (League of Nations Association, Inc.).
Cf. Forbes v. Commissioner, 7 B. T. A. 209 (1927) (American School Citizenship League),-
Cochran v. Commissioner, 79 F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) (World League Against
Alcoholism); Dahlinger v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A. 176 (1930) (Pennsylvania League
of Women Voters).
29. 40 B. T. A. 1379 (1939).
30. Faulkner v. Commissioner, 112 F. (2d) 987, 992 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
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only to income taxes, affects only individuals and corporations, and is measured
by 15% of the net income, excluding charitable contributions in the case of
an individual, and 5% thereof in the case of a corporation. Iri holding that a
capital net gain should be included in the computation of income to which
the 15% limitation applies, the Supreme Court observed that the charities
provisions and the capital gains provisions
"were liberalizations of the law in the taxpayer's favor, were begotten from motives
of public policy, and are not to be narrowly construed."31
If, in the case of a capital net gain, the gain should be added in arriving at
the base to which the percentage formula applies, it appeared to the Commis-
sioner that in the case of a capital net loss the loss should be deducted from
such base; but the Court of Claims in a carefully reasoned opinion,82 held
that such was not the Congressional intent, and the Supreme Court, repeating
the observation quoted above added: "That observation is equally pertinent
here",3 and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Claims.
Applying these decisions to the present provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code, the Bureau has ruled3 4 that in all cases where there is a net long-term
capital gain, the gain is to be included in computing the income to which
the 15% limitation applies, and that in all cases where there is a net long-term
capital loss, and the taxpayer computes his tax under the alternative provisions,
the capital net loss is not to be taken into account in computing the income
which is the basis of the 15% limitation.
One further problem in relation to the 15% limitation remained for judicial
determination-whether, where a husband and wife file a joint return, the
aggregate income of both, or only the income of the spouse making the con-
tribution, should be the base for the percentage formula. After an uphill
fight, the taxpayer prevailed. Mr. and Mrs. H. W. Taft's 1934 joint income
tax return showed an aggregate net income of over $83,000, after a deduction
of $2,852 on account of contributions made by both. Mrs. Taft's net income
before any deduction for charitable contributions was only $12.10. Her con-
tributions amounted to $1,477. Of the last mentioned amount, the Commis-
sioner disallowed all but $1.81 (15% of $12.10). The 1935 joint return re-
flected a similar situation. The Board sustained the Commissioner,35 ruling
that the "spouses do not lose their identities as individual taxpayers by joining
in a single income tax return". The circuit court affirmed per curiam,36 but the
Supreme Court reversed,3 7 holding that the base for the calculation of the
31. Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U. S. 144, 151 (1934).
32. Pleasants v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 964 (Ct. C1. 1938).
33. United States v. Pleasants, 305 U. S. 357, 363 (1939).
34. I. T. 3345, C. B. 40-1, 54.
35. Taft v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 229 (1939).
36. Taft v. Helvering, 111 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
37. Taft v. Helvering, 311 U. S. 195 (1940).
[Vol. 10
COMMENTS
contribution deduction was the aggregate income of the husband and wife.
The liberality of the courts in construing the charities provisions even extends
to approval of an obvious device for the purpose of avoiding the 15% limita-
tion. Thus, in Andrus v. Burnet,88 eight individuals transferred property worth
$400,000 to a charity, and took back notes of $400,000 in denominations of
$10,000 maturing serially over five years. The notes were cancelled as they
matured, and the grantors sought corresponding income tax deductions for
charitable contributions during the years of such cancellations. The Board,8 9
had ruled that when the property was transferred to the corporation, a gift
thereof was made then and there, and disallowed the deduction in the subse-
quent years; but the Circuit Court upheld the device and allowed the deduc-
tion, seeing no "wrongful evasion of the tax... even if conceded to have been
an arrangement of properties to minimize taxation". If the Andrus case had
involved any provisions of the Code other than the charities provisions, is it not
likely that the arrangement for issuing and cancelling notes would have been
characterized as a mere ritual, to be ignored for tax purposes?
An even broader avenue of escape was allowed by the Board in Giannini v.
Commissioner.40 In this case, the taxpayer had declined to accept compensation
for services rendered to a corporation of which he was President, in addition to
the amount previously credited to him, although the Board of Directors had
unanimously adopted a committee report recommending such additional com-
pensation. He had indicated to his Board, however, that he would find keen
satisfaction in seeing the corporation, if it should be so minded, devote the
money to the establishment of a foundation by the University of California.
It was then estimated that the compensation would amount to $1,500,000.
Thereupon, the Board approved the donation to the University. When, later
on, it was ascertained that the actual amount of the proposed compensation
was short by approximately $140,000 of the original estimate, the taxpayer
personally made up the difference. The Board held that he was not taxable
on any part of the compensation so voted to him but actually donated to
the University. Here, again, it may. be doubted whether the same result would
have been reached had the donee of the fund been other than a charity.
If taxpayers were permitted "carry-overs" of excess contributions, resort
would not so frequently be made to obvious devices designed to avoid the
15% limitation, such as that employed in the Andrus case or that of lending
an art collection to an educational corporation in one year, and donating from
year to year thereafter specified works in the collection.
To the rule that an individual's deductible charitable contributions may
not exceed 15% of his income, the Code provides a single exception. The
enactment of this provision41 arose from an unusual situation. A* wealthy
38. 50 F. (2d) 332 (App. D. C. 1931).
39. Andrus v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 479 (1929).
40. 42 B. T. A. 546 (1940)
41. 26 U. S. C. A. § 120.
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woman, having become a nun, relinquished her income to the religious order
with which she was affiliated. She had paid no taxes on the income over a
period of years, but the Internal Revenue Bureau, applying the 15% statutory
limitation, found substantial taxes due. Recognizing the equities of the case,
Congress, in the Revenue Act of 1924,42 provided that the 15% limitation
should not apply if, in the taxable year, and in each of the ten preceding tax-
dble years, the charitable contributions exceeded 90% of the taxpayer's net
income for each year, as computed without the benefit of deductions for such
contributions. It was then discovered that since a substantial part of the net
income was needed to pay the taxes due for prior years, the new provision
served no purpose, whereupon, in the Revenue Act of 1928, 4 3 Congress amended
the section to provide for an unlimited deduction if'--the charitable contribu-
tions plus income taxes for each of the years aggregated 90% of the net income.
Only one case under this section has come before the Board of Tax Appeals.
In that case, the deduction for charitable contributions was disallowed because,
although the donor's contributions and income taxes for the ten-year period
averaged over 90% of his income, there were three years in which the percentage
was less than 90% of the income. Since the statute applied only in case "in
each of the ten preceding taxable years" the contributions and taxes exceeded
90% of the income, the Board was constrained to hold:
"We cannot disregard language so specific as that which is set forth in the statute."44
(c) Income Tax Deductions of Estates and Trusts
The charities provision allowing income tax deductions to estates and trusts
differs from the other charities provisions allowing such deductions in that it
is not necessary thereunder that the gift be paid-to an organized charity, but
is sufficient that "pursuant to the terms of the will or deed creating the trust"
it be "permanently set aside" for charitable purposes. As in the case of all the
other charities provisions, the rule of liberal construction has been applied here.
The term "permanently set aside", as judicially interpreted, means not "with
absolute certainty permanently set aside", but "in all probability permanently
set aside"; the term "pursuant to the terms of the will or trust instrument"
means not "as required" by such terms, but "as permitted" by such terms, and
the term "to be used exclusively for charitable purposes" does not preclude use
for other purposes. The following cases illustrate the point.
In Commissioner v. Bonfils Trust4 5 the terms of the decedent's will required
that capital gains be added to the corpus of the trust, which was payable to a
charity after the death of the last survivor of several annuitants. One of the
42. Revenue Act of 1924, § 214(a) (10).
43. Revenue Act of 1928, § 120.
44. Post v. Commissioner, Board of Tax Appeals, Docket No. 83921, Memo. Op. entered
April 26th, 1939.
45. 115 F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940).
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issues involved was whether the trust was entitled to an income tax deduction of
the amount of the capital gains so claimed to have been set aside during
the year for charitable purposes. The annuities for the years considered by the
court were well covered by income. Still, as the dissenting Judge pointed out,
it could not "be foretold with absolute certainty that such condition will always
exist to the death of the last survivor of the annuitants". But the court deter-
mined to be "realistic", reached its conclusion by a consideration of the "degree
of probability" that the fund would not be resorted to for other than char-
itable purposes, found that it was "practically certain" that the fund would
not be so resorted to, and sustained the Board in allowing the deduction. 6 Of a
companion case decided the same day, in which the same question was pre-
sented, the Board had said that the facts proved that "the probability of the
invasion of corpus is so remote as to be negligible." 4 7 In Upjohn v. Commis-
sioner4" the Board had a similar situation before it, and followed the rule of
the Bonfils case.49
It was in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner50 that the Supreme Court
determined that "pursuant to the terms of the . . . deed creating the trust"
included mere authorization under the trust instrument. Accordingly, where
trustees were authorized to pay to charities such sums as in their judgment
might be paid without jeopardizing annuities, the payments were held to be
"pursuant to the terms" of the trust deed.
In Bedford v. Commissioner,5' the decedent's will provided that his wife
should have the use for life of his country estate, Valued at over $1,000,000,
whereon he had maintained extensive gardens which were open daily to the
public without charge. His will also provided that after the death of his wife,
his daughter might occupy the residence during her life, and directed his
trustees to pay his daughter in any one year such sum, not exceeding $10,000,
as might be necessary in maintaining the gardens if she should continue to
maintain them, and permit the public to enjoy them, as he had done during his
lifetime. During the year, $7,500 was paid to her for that purpose, and was
claimed as an income tax deduction by the estate as an amount paid pursuant
to the terms of a will exclusively for educational or charitable purposes. The
Commissioner, having disallowed the deduction, argued that the money so
46. Bonfils v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 1085 (1939).
47. Bonfils v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 1079 (1939).
48. Board of Tax Appeals, Docket No. 97178, Memo. Op. entered July 9th, 1940.
49. Consideration of the "degree of probability" led to a denial of the deduction in
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 66 F. (2d) 179, (C. C. A. 1st, 1933);
Tracy v. Commissioner, 30 B. T. A. 1156 (1934); Jaynes v. Commissioner, 29 B. T. A. 259
(1933); Bank of America National Association v: Commissioner, 19 B. T. A. 1273 (1930).
See also Tonningsen v. Commissioner, Board of Tax Appeals, Docket No. 99280, Memo.
Op. entered Dec. 10th, 1940.
50. 301 U. S. 379 (1937).
51. 39 B. T. A. 1039 (1939).
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paid was not to be used "exclusively" for charitable purposes, since not only
would the life tenant benefit from the maintenance of the gardens, but the re,
sale value of the estate, whenever sale took place, would thus be enhanced.
The Board, however, applying the familiar rule first established in Trinidad v.
Sagrada Orden de Predicadores,5 2 held that the word "exclusively" would not
serve to defeat a claimed deduction where the primary use was charitable,
and found for the estate.
(d) Estate Tax Deductions
The cases dealing with estate tax deductions where the representative of a
decedent's estate is vested with certain discretion to devote assets of the estate
to charitable purposes further evidence the disposition of the courts to find a
basis for sustaining the deductions. Four cases, in two of which the deduction
was disallowed, will illustrate this point.
In Taylor v. Commissioner3 the testator bequeathed to his executors a sum
of money for the purpose of establishing a "memorial" to his parents. The
executors, acting under the will, paid to Grace Church, a religious corporation,
the sum of $6,000. The Board disallowed the deduction, holding that "me-
morial" did not connote any limitation wifinh the language of the statute,
and that reasonably a memorial might have been established without any
charitable, scientific, educational or religious purpose. The fact that the
trustees in the exercise of their discretion had actually paid the money to a
religious organization was disregarded.
In Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, testator provided:
"I have heretofore expressed to my sons my wishes as to certain charitable gifts,
and I therefore make no such bequests herein, preferring that my sons shall make
such donations within their sole discretion as shall seem to them to be best." 54
The most that could be said of that provision, said the Court, was that the
sons were permitted to give, or not, any or all of the estate to such charities
as they might determine, and disallowed the deduction although the record
showed that the sons had donated $1,000,000 to St. Louis University for the
purpose of erecting a hospital in memory of their father.
In Beggs v. United States, the testator made the following provision:
"I devise and direct that all the net proceeds from the sale of my estate as herein
provided shall under the direction of my executor, with the advice of my sister...
be ... given to such charities and worthy objects as they . . .shall determine ....
It is my intention to Write to my said sister, indicating to her my, special friends,
charities and worthy objects, I may wish my executor with her advice to provide
for, . .. 55
52. 263 U. S. 578 (1924).
53. 40 B. T. A. 375 (1939).
54. 72 F. (2d) 197, 198 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), cert. denied 293 U. S. 604, rehearing de-
nied 293 U. S. 631.
55. 27 F. Supp. 599, 600 (Ct. C1. 1939).
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Here, at least, there was a devise to "such charities and worthy objects" as
the executors should select, and although there was room for an opinion that
"worthy objects" might have been other than objects specified in the statute,
the court took notice that in fact the amounts were distributed to tax-exempt
institutions, and held that "worthy objects" and "special friends" were used in
the sense that the testator directed that the proceeds be given to charities.
The farthest that the courts have gone, however, is in Brown v. Commis-
sioner. Here it was provided that the trustees of a decedent should use the
residue of a trust
"in such way or manner, and at such time or times, and in such proportions and
upon such conditions as said Trustees or the survivors of them may, in the exercise
of their sole and uncontrolled judgment, deem to be wise and best, bearing in mind
the ideals of said Settlor with reference to the ownership of money and to the ideas
on the general subject as expressed by him from time to time." 50
It will be observed that no mention or even suggestion is made herein of a
charitable bequest, yet the court considered evidence that the trustees were
personal friends of the decedent and knew of his plans to erect a church as a
memorial to his wife. Actually, they did devote the residue of the estate to this
purpose. Sustaining the deduction, the court concluded that it was as though
the knowledge of the trustees was incorporated into the will, and that they had.
exercised a power which related back to the testator's death.
It is most natural that a testator should first provide for his family, but
once he seeks to make a bequest to a charitable organization, and at the same
time ties strings to the bequest so that his family may obtain the funds if
needed, the estate tax deduction for the charitable bequest is put into jeopardy.
A deduction in such a case was allowed in Ithaca Trust Co. v. U. S.,57 but in
Knoernschild v. Commissioner,"8 the estate was not so fortunate. In the Ithaca
Trust Co. case the will provided that the residue was to be placed in trust, the
income was to be paid to the wife for life, and upon her death the residue was
to go to charities. The trustees were given the power, however, to pay to the
wife from the principal any sum "that may be necessary to suitably maintain
her in as much comfort as she now. enjoys". Evidence was introduced that
the income had at all times been sufficient, and that there was little likelihood
that this power would be used. The Court concluded that the remainder was
deductible, saying: "There was no uncertainty appreciably greater than the
general uncertainty that attends human affairs". In the Knoernschild 'case
the decedent had left to Holy Angels Academy of the City of Milwaukee, an
institution admittedly exempt under the law, a sum of approximately $114,000,
but at the same time granted to his daughter, who was then in the sisterhood,
the privilege
56. So F. (2d) 842, 843 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931).
57. 279 U. S. 151 (1929).
58. 97 F. (2d) 213 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
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"to direct said trustees to pay from said fund any part of the income or principal as
my daughter may in her judgment see fit for the purpose of providing for her mother
or any of her brothers or sisters in case they are in need of financial assistance."59
"Financial assistance", the Court pointed out, was a broad term which might
include vast sums of money, and since the gift to the Academy was not by its
terms final and conclusive, the deduction was disallowed.
Similarly, in Nicholas v. Commissioner,6° where a decedent left a bequest to a
charitable corporation to be selected by his sister and nephew under a pro-
vision which directed that if the executor did not receive from them a notice
in writing designating the educational institution within a year from the date of
probate of his will, the legacy should lapse and become part of his residuary
estate, the Board had no aliernative except to hold that the last word was
that of the sister and nephew of the decedent; that all the will did was to
create a simple alternative, a charitable bequest if certain living individuals
so chose, a bequest to private legatees, if such individuals elected otherwise.6'
Conclusion
(1) If it be the Congressional theory that the United States derives no
benefits from gifts to foreign institutions, and, therefore, that tax deductions
for gifts and bequests to foreign institutions should not be allowed, the charities
provisions, should be amended consistently to reflect that theory. In any event,
they should be revised to eliminate existing discrepancies.
(2) The judicial approach is that of sympathetic liberalization, the con-
sistent disposition being to lay aside the rules of strict construction of a tax
statute, to strain every word and phrase of the charities provisions, and to
seek to harmonize therewith every provision of a trust or will relating to a
59. 97 F. (2d) 213, 214 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
60. 40 B. T. A. 1040 (1939).
61. So, too, where a testator bequeathed property in trust for charities but empowered
his wife to invade the corpus to ,the extent that she "may at any time and from time to
time need or desire," an estate tax deduction for a charitable bequest was denied on the
ground that the word "desire" was so broad as to make the amount which would go to
the charities unascertainable. Gammons v. Hassett, 36 F. Supp..529 (D. C. Mass. 1941).
In Robbins v. Commissioner, 39 B. T. A. 599. (1939), aff'd 111 F. (2d) 828 (C. C. A. 1st,
1940), it was held that a gift to a charity depending on the exercise of a power of appoint-
ment was not deductible. Similarly, a bequest in default of the exercise of a power of
appointment was held not deductible. The Board held that an irrevocable renunciation of
the power five years later would not relate back to the date of the testator's death. Davison
v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 101 (1934).
That conditional bequests to charities are not deductible.is well settled. United States v.
Fourth National Bank in Wichita, 83 F. (2d) 85 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936), cert. denied 299
U. S. 575 (1936); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Burnet, 59 F. (2d) 922 (C. C. A. 8th,
1932); Delaware Trust Co. v. Handy, 53 F. (2d) 1042 (D. C. Ore. 1931); Old Point
National Bank v. Commissioner, 39 B. T. A. 343 (1939). See also Internal Revenue Regu-
lations 80, Article 47; E. T. 13, 1939-2 C. B., 326.
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charity, to the end that the charity or the donor may be favored, stopping only
where, to hold otherwise, would open the door to wholesale evasion. So intent
have the courts been to further the Congressional policy of encouraging gifts
to charity that in several cases where the issue has been whether or not an
organization was a charity, adequate consideration does not appear to have
been given to the underlying theory of the charities provisions-promotion
of the general welfare and relief of the Government from financial burdens. The
needs of the Government are great, and growing; so, too, are the needs of our
churches, our schools and colleges, our hospitals and asylums. These un-
questionably promote the general welfare. These unquestionably relieve the
Government from financial burdens. An overgenerous judicial disposition in
favor of organizations whose claim to promotion of the general welfare is far
less certain, may, in time, jeopardize the tax-exempt status of true charities.
With this exception, it is believed that most will approve the judicial attitude
toward the charities provisions.
